What makes some people think astrology is scientific? by Allum, N
  
 
 
 
What Makes Some People Think Astrology is Scientific? 
 
Nick Allum 
Department of Sociology 
University of Essex 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Anyone reading this article is likely at some point to have read their horoscope. Astrology 
columns are widespread in print media, and have been a staple for a surprisingly long time. The first 
columnist was 17th century astrologer William Lily, who famously predicted the Great Fire of 
London, albeit 14 years early.  Webster-Merriam dictionary defines astrology as „divination of the 
supposed influences of the stars and planets on human affairs and terrestrial events by their 
positions and aspects‟. A horoscope, on the other hand is defined as a„diagram of the relative 
positions of planets and signs of the zodiac at a specific time (as at one's birth) for use by 
astrologers in inferring individual character and personality traits and in foretelling events of a 
person's life‟.  The more common understanding of horoscopes is that they are astrological 
forecasts, such as those that appear in newspapers.  It is this definition that I use for the rest of the 
paper.  Ten years ago, just under half of Americans read their horoscope at least occasionally in 
1999 (National Science Board, 2000) and 44 percent of British citizens in 1996 and there is little 
reason to think that the numbers have declined since then.  
It is one thing to read an astrology column for amusement or entertainment, but quite 
another to believe that astrological predictions about events or personality will come true. A 
surprisingly large quantity of scientific research has been carried out to evaluate the claims of 
astrology.  Less surprisingly, there is really no evidence to support such claims (Blackmore & 
Seebold, 2001; Carlson, 1985; Eysenck & Nias, 1982).  It is therefore cause for concern if citizens 
make important life decisions based on entirely unreliable astrological predictions. For this reason, 
in 1984, the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (at that time the Committee for Scientific 
Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal) began a campaign to persuade American magazines and 
newspapers to attach a „health warning‟ to horoscope columns to indicate that they were to be read 
for entertainment purposes only.  Only around 70 publications out of 1000 or more in America that 
carry horoscopes have agreed thus far to carry such a warning. This probably indicates that 
newspaper proprietors don‟t want to spoil their readers‟ enjoyment by telling them that they should 
really ignore all the advice given.  But perhaps people do not set any store by astrological 
predictions and a health warning is really not necessary.  After all, one does not need to believe 
something is true to be entertained by reading it.  However it appears that belief in astrological 
claims is quite widespread, at least in America.  Losh and colleagues, in a review of 20 years of US 
survey data, found that many Americans believed in astrology, with polls putting the figure at 
around 25 percent (Losh, Tavani, Njoroge, Wilke, & Mcauley, 2003; National Science Board, 
2002). 
1.1 Astrology and science 
Why should the credulity of some sections of the public towards astrology be a matter for 
concern for science communicators? Even if people do believe in astrology, or ghosts and alien 
abductions for that matter, does this have a bearing on people‟s understanding of and engagement 
with science?  Again, the evidence is that it probably does.  For not only do sizeable proportions of 
the American and European publics believe in the efficacy of astrology, they also believe that it is 
scientific. The ability of citizens to distinguish between scientific and pseudo-scientific claims is 
seen by many as an important component of scientific literacy.  In a social and economic 
environment increasingly permeated by science, and the technological developments that flow from 
it, citizens require some basic competencies in order to meaningfully engage in rational judgments 
about a whole host of issues.  For example, climate change, biofuels, stem-cell cloning, synthetic 
biology are all topics that have acquired, or are quickly gaining, political status, which in turn 
require societal decisions to be made. In Miller‟s framework for measuring civic scientific literacy, 
the rejection of astrology is an empirical criterion for identifying those who are and are not 
scientifically literate (Miller, 2004).   Surveys in Europe and America have tracked public beliefs 
about astrology and science since 1988.  In America, respondents have been asked whether 
astrology is „very scientific, sort of scientific or not at all scientific‟. Around 60 per cent said 
astrology is not at all scientific with around 30 per cent saying it is „sort of scientific‟ in seven 
surveys between 1988 and 2001.  In 2004, the proportion rejecting astrology rose slightly, to 66 per 
cent (National Science Board, 2006).  In Europe, there appears to be more widespread belief that 
astrology is scientific. In 1992, respondents were asked how scientific they thought astrology was, 
with a 5-point scale anchored at either end with „very scientific‟ or „not at all scientific‟.  Only one 
quarter considered astrology „not at all scientific‟, with another quarter considering it „very 
scientific‟ and the remaining respondents falling somewhere in between (INRA, 1993). In 2001 the 
question was asked in a slightly different way, with only two response options offered – „rather 
scientific‟ or „not scientific‟. 53 per cent thought astrology was „rather scientific‟ (European 
Commission, 2001a).  
The evidence, then, suggests that a sizeable minority of Americans and an even greater 
proportion of Europeans believe that astrology in some sense „works‟, either because it is based on 
scientific methods or for other reasons. What might account for this widespread belief? And more 
interestingly, perhaps, what might explain differences in degree of belief in astrology between 
individuals and groups?    
The most widely held explanation is less to do with the characteristics of the believer but 
more to do with the nature of astrological predictions themselves. The „Barnum effect‟ has been 
studied by extensively by psychologists. Named after the 19th century showman Phileas T. Barnum, 
it refers to the idea that people will believe statements about their personality that is vague or trivial 
if they think that it derives from some systematic procedure tailored to especially for them (Dickson 
& Kelly, 1985; Furnham & Schofield, 1987). The more birth detail is used in an astrological 
prediction or horoscope, the more credulous people tend to be (Furnham, 1991).  The fact that 
people tend to assume that the more complex the information used as input into astrological 
readings, perhaps points to the reasoning that people use in mistaking astrology for science. “It 
sounds complicated – it must be scientific!” 
 
1.2 The present study 
While the Barnum effect is a fairly well-understood phenomenon that has been observed 
over experiments with an array of different kinds of participants, much less is known about 
heterogeneity of belief about astrology. The present study sets out to evaluate several potential 
explanations for variation in the credibility given to astrology qua science by European citizens, 
using a recent Eurobarometer survey.  In doing so, I also examine how astrology is viewed 
alongside other knowledge generating practices, scientific or otherwise, in order to understand 
where astrology is located in the European public‟s representational field. In the following sections, 
I briefly outline some putative factors that I consider might account for variation in citizens‟ beliefs 
before describing in more detail the data and methods used for the empirical analysis. 
 
1.2.1 The ‘immunisation’ hypothesis 
From a traditional science communication perspective, it is scientific knowledge, 
particularly knowledge of the methods of science, that would be expected to „immunise‟ citizens 
against false belief in pseudoscience. Hence those who are more scientifically literate, who 
understand principles of experimentation, the combining of empirical evidence with logical 
inference and so forth, should be more likely to realise that astrology, for all its formalistic 
presentation, is not consistent with the tenets of scientific method.  The survey evidence broadly 
supports this hypothesis, albeit indirectly. In both Europe and America, correlates of scepticism 
about astrology‟s „scientificness‟ tend to be higher levels of education, higher social class and 
income although there is some inconsistency between surveys. In 1992 Eurobarometer surveys 
showed that more highly educated Europeans were less likely to think that astrology is scientific, 
whereas in 2001, this was not the case (European Commission, 2001a). In America, education has 
been a consistent predictor.  For example, the most recent NSF data show that while 84 per cent of 
college graduates think that astrology is not at all scientific, just 62 per cent of those who only 
graduated from high school share this belief (National Science Board, 2008).  Education is not, of 
course, coterminous with scientific knowledge, but it is strongly correlated (Allum, Sturgis, 
Tabourazi, & Brunton-Smith, 2008; Miller, 2004).  Income and social class are themselves 
invariably correlated with education. Examining the relationship between scientific knowledge and 
belief in astrology as a science net of education, income and social class, would be a stronger test of 
the „immunising‟ hypothesis, and one which I test in this paper.  
 
1.2.2 What’s in a name? 
One of the better established findings in survey measurement is that responses can be 
extremely sensitive to the particular form of words used in the asking of the question (Schuman & 
Presser, 1996).  In the European surveys reviewed earlier, the English version of the questionnaire 
uses the word „astrology‟ as the stimulus object of the item: “People can have different opinions 
about what is scientific and what is not.  I am going to read out a list of subjects. For each one tell 
me how scientific you think it is by the scale on this card … [other subjects] … Astrology”.  It is 
possible that people are unfamiliar with the this term but may be more familiar with terms like 
„horoscopes‟, „star signs‟, „sun signs‟, which, if asked how scientific they are, might elicit different 
results.  In fact, there is some evidence on this from the 1992 Eurobarometer survey. Respondents 
were randomised to two different versions of the list of subjects. One simply contained the single 
word, as above, while in the other condition, a brief explanation of each subject was given.  For 
astrology, the explanation was: “…that is the study of occult influence of stars, planets etc. on 
human affairs”. There was no significant difference in responses between the two conditions 
(INRA, 1993).  However, in most European languages the suffix „ology‟, „ologie‟, „ologia‟ 
connotes an academic field of study. This may be enough to encourage respondents to think that 
astrology is indeed a science where the use of an alternative term may bring to mind a different kind 
of activity.  Another hypothesis that has intuitive plausibility, but which has not previously been 
tested, is that many people mistake astrology for astronomy – a simple semantic confusion.  The 
extent to which this might occur is also likely to vary across countries according to the similarity of 
the two terms in different languages.      
 
1.2.3 The stars down to earth 
The explanations just outlined for belief, or apparent belief, in the scientificness of astrology 
are, in one form or another, based on deficits of understanding and information. There may be other 
reasons why some people more than others place faith in astrological predictions.  One of the most 
interesting social psychological viewpoints on this question is found in the work of Theodor 
Adorno.   In 1952-3, Adorno carried out a study of Caroll Righter‟s Los Angeles Times astrology 
column.  The fruits of this did not appear in English until published in „Telos‟ in 1974 as „The stars 
down to earth‟ (Adorno, 1974). In the study, referred to by the author as a „content analysis‟, 
Adorno analyses, somewhat haphazardly and selectively, the advice given to readers in the column 
over a period of several months. He identifies many of the aspects of astrological readings that other 
psychological research (e.g. Forer, 1949) confirmed were effective in making them convincing: the 
Barnum effect, the tendency to personalise general statements and so forth. He is witheringly 
critical of astrology, dubbing it, with the rest of occultism, a „metaphysic of dunces‟ and suggesting 
that „a climate of semi-erudition is the fertile breeding ground for astrology‟(Adorno, 1994 p.44).  
The claim is that it resembles other „irrational creeds‟ like racism by offering a shortcut to 
(erroneous) knowledge which actually requires no intellectual effort or capacity (Dutton, 1995).  
What is more interesting for the present study, though, is the connection drawn between 
astrology (and other forms of popular occultism) with authoritarianism, fascism and modern 
capitalism. Adorno sees astrology as emphasising conformity and deference to higher authority of 
some kind. Nederman and Goulding sum this up concisely as „Take things as they are, since you are 
fated for them anyway‟ (Nederman & Goulding, 1981).  Adorno posits an „astrological ideology‟ 
that he claims „resembles, in all its major characteristics, the mentality of the „high scorers‟ of the 
Authoritarian Personality‟ (Adorno, 1994).  The work on „Authoritarian Personality‟ by Adorno and 
colleagues has been much criticised since its appearance in 1950 (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Kirscht & Dillehay, 1967) with particular criticism being directed 
towards the test items in the „F-Scale‟ (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954).  Nevertheless, it is possible to 
deduce a reasonably clear empirical hypothesis from „stars down to earth‟.  Those who value 
conformity, obedience and tend towards uncritical acceptance of in-group moral authority will be 
more likely to give credence to the claims of astrology.  
Adorno also discusses the relationship of organised religion, or religious belief with 
astrological belief. He suggests that part of astrology‟s appeal is that it formalises the notion of 
some higher authority at work controlling life events yet does not come with the explicitly 
restrictive  structure of formal religious adherence, churchgoing and so on. This is part of what, for 
Adorno, makes astrological belief and capitalist individualism such well-suited bedfellows. That is 
to say that religious belief and astrological belief are both consistent with the same authoritarian 
trait of personality.  If this is true, one might expect beliefs about astrology and about religion or 
God to be related.     
 1.3 Hypotheses and questions 
The foregoing discussion leads to the derivation of the following hypotheses: 
 
H1  The suffix „ology‟ means that people should tend to rate „astrology‟ as more scientific than 
„horoscopes‟.  
H2a Because of potential confusion or elision of meaning between „astronomy‟ and „astrology‟, 
we should expect there to be a positive correlation between how people rate the scientificness of 
these two subjects. 
H2b Assuming H2a to be correct, we should not expect to see the same positive correlation 
between ratings of horoscopes and astronomy because the potential for semantic confusion is much 
less. 
H3 Citizens who are more knowledgeable about science should be less likely to rate astrology 
as scientific. 
H4 Following Adorno‟s thesis, we should expect that people who score higher on a measure of 
authoritarianism will be more likely to rate astrology as being scientific. 
 
In addition to the evaluation of these empirical expectations, there are two more general 
questions that are addressed in the analysis that follows: 
 
Q1 How is astrology viewed by Europeans in relation to other scientific and non-scientific 
subjects? 
Q2 How much of the variability in beliefs about astrology across Europe related to country of 
citizenship? 
 
2 DATA AND MEASURES 
2.1 Data 
The data for this study come from the Special Eurobarometer 224 and 225 surveys, 
„Europeans, Science and Technology‟, „Social Values, Science and Technology‟ (European 
Commission, 2005a; 2005b).  Both these survey modules were fielded as part of the same face-to-
face interview to citizens in 25 EU member states during the fall of 2004.  Approximately 1000 
respondents were interviewed in each country, using a multistage probability design. (For more 
details on the survey methodology see European Commission, 2005a).  The resultant dataset 
contains rich information on citizens‟ beliefs, attitudes and knowledge about science and 
technology, as well as on political and social values.  Also embedded within the survey was a split-
ballot randomised question wording experiment. 
 
2.2 Measures 
The key dependent variable, belief in the scientificness of astrology, was measured by 
asking respondents how scientific they consider each of ten subjects to be, on a scale from 1 to 5 
where 1 indicates “not at all scientific” and 5 indicates “very scientific”.  As part of the list of ten 
subjects a randomised half of the sample was asked about “astrology” and the other half about 
“horoscopes”.  The other nine subjects were: physics, medicine, astronomy, economics, history, 
homeopathy, psychology, biology and mathematics. (The exact question wordings and response 
alternatives for the English questionnaire for all of the measures employed in the analysis are shown 
in the appendix). 
Authoritarian values are measured with a single indicator. While this is a good way short of 
ideal in terms of best practice in measurement, the question employed has what appears to be good 
face validity.  Respondents are shown a list of qualities that children might be encouraged to learn. 
One of these qualities is „obedience‟. Responses to this item are on a 4-point scale ranging from 
„not at all important‟ to „very important‟.  Also related to Adorno‟s work on authoritarianism is 
religious belief. To capture this, I use an item that asks whether a respondent believes in „God‟, a 
„spirit‟ or neither. From this categorical variable, two dummy variables have been derived, 
indicating belief in God or belief in a spirit (both versus no belief).  I also use a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the respondent is Catholic. The majority of Europeans are Christians of 
some type, so distinguishing between Catholics and all others is a reasonable way of simply 
controlling for religious denomination in the analysis in the absence of any particular hypotheses 
about denomination-based differences in beliefs about astrology.   
Knowledge about science is measured in a number of ways in the survey and in the analysis 
I use three separate indicators. Two of these tap into respondents‟ understanding of scientific 
process and method. An understanding of method is arguably central to being able to distinguish 
between scientific and pseudoscientific claims.  People were asked „what does it mean to study 
something scientifically?‟ The verbatim responses were coded into one of several mutually 
exclusive categories, based on what was said (in other words, not pre-coded). Typically this 
question has been a very good predictor of attitudes and beliefs about science [see miller xxxx] with 
the mention of hypothesis testing and experimentation as the critical component. Here I use this as 
an indicator of greater scientific understanding along with another indicator based on the 
mentioning of „measurement‟ in response to the question. The third indicator is a summated scale of 
correct responses to a series of 13 true/false quiz items that tap textbook type knowledge about 
scientific facts. For the purposes of this analysis, „don‟t know‟ responses are coded with a zero, the 
same way as incorrect true/false answers.  The scale has reasonable internal consistency with a 
Cronbach‟s Alpha coefficient of 0.72. 
A range of other background characteristics were measured in the survey and used in the 
analysis. Respondent age was coded in bands: 16-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55+.  Occupational status was 
measured with a dummy variable contrasting white collar and management occupations with all 
others. This is a necessarily crude indicator as it is based on standardised Eurobarometer 
occupational coding that needs to be comparable across European states.  However, as it is only 
being used as a control variable in the analyses that follow, it is not critical to obtain a more fine-
grained estimate of the effects of occupational status on beliefs about astrology. Education is 
measured, again quite bluntly, with a variable that indicates whether or not the respondent left full 
time education after the age of 20. This broadly distinguishes the graduate population, and it is this 
distinction that has in previous research been shown to be the most diagnostic of differences in 
attitudes and beliefs about science and technology (e.g. Miller, Pardo, & Niwa, 1997). Finally, the 
type of area in which the respondent lives is captured with a variable that indicates residence in a 
large town versus other types of area. Typically one might expect urban populations to have 
different cultural and political orientations to rural and provincial populations, net of education and 
occupational differences, hence this variable is used as a control.  
 
3 RESULTS 
3.1 Split ballot experiment 
Figure 1 shows the response distributions for the two experimental conditions. In one 
condition, respondents were asked how scientific they thought astrology was and in the other how 
scientific did they think horoscopes were.  Quite clearly, many more Europeans think astrology 
scientific than horoscopes. 57 per cent think that horoscopes are “not at all scientific”, while only 24 
per cent believe the same about astrology. About one quarter of the sample believe astrology to be 
“very scientific”, while only 7 per cent think that horoscopes are “very scientific”.  The difference 
in distributions is highly significant (Chi2 3400 (4df), p<.001. n=23,473).  Astrology is clearly 
viewed as greatly more scientifically credible than horoscopes and this is in line with the 
expectations set out in H1.    Another point to note is that the there is a great deal more 
heterogeneity in beliefs about astrology than about horoscopes, with both „very scientific‟ and „not 
at all scientific‟ each attracting one quarter of all respondents. 
 
Figure 1 How scientific is astrology/are horoscopes? 
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3.2 The relationship between astrology, horoscopes and other subjects 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of European beliefs about the scientificness of all 11 subjects 
included in the questionnaire (including both horoscopes and astrology).  The chart is ranked in 
descending order according to the percentage of people thinking each subject is „very scientific‟. As 
can be seen, the list includes a range of more or less scientific subjects, including both horoscopes 
and astrology, along with homeopathy, as examples of pseudoscience.  
Medicine is viewed as the most scientific subject, followed closely by physics and then 
biology. Horoscopes are least likely to be thought “very scientific”, followed by homeopathy, 
history and economics (17,18 and 19 per cent respectively).  In most respects this is not a surprising 
result. The natural sciences are at the top with social and behavioural subjects lower down. What is 
somewhat surprising, although in line with other surveys (European Commission, 2001b), is that 
astrology is considered to be more scientific than economics, and only just less so than is 
psychology. 
 
Figure 2  ‘Scientificness’ of eleven activities (%) 
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Figure 2 suggests some ambivalence about the scientific status of astrology if not 
homeopathy and horoscopes. Hypothesis 3 predicts that those who are more scientifically literate 
will be less likely to regard astrology as scientific. In more general terms, one might expect a higher 
degree of understanding of science to confer greater ability to discriminate between science and 
pseudoscience in general. Later in the paper I shall return to this hypothesis in a multivariate setting 
but it is interesting to see what happens when the result in  
Figure 2 is stratified by scientific knowledge  
The number of correct answers given by each respondent was used as an indicator of science 
literacy that runs from 0 to 13.   Figure 3 plots the percentage of Europeans selecting “very 
scientific” or the scale point below at each successive level of scientific knowledge.    Also plotted 
out of interest is the percentage agreement with another the statement in the questionnaire that 
arguably taps into superstitious beliefs “some numbers are lucky for some people”. 
 
Figure 3  Beliefs about ‘scientificness’ vs science knowledge  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 s
ay
in
g 
's
ci
e
n
ti
fi
c'
 o
r 
'v
e
ry
 s
ci
e
n
ti
fi
c'
Number of correct answers to knowledge quiz
Astrology Horoscopes Homeopathy Medicine Psychology Some numbers are lucky
 
 
The plot shows that there is a noticeably steep negative gradient with scientific knowledge 
for belief in the pseudosciences homeopathy, astrology and in lucky numbers. For instance between 
50 and 60 per cent of citizens scoring 3 out of 13 on the knowledge quiz believe in the scientific 
credibility of homeopathy and astrology, and believe in lucky numbers. That percentage drops to 
just 15 to 25 per cent for those that obtain a maximum score on the knowledge quiz. In contrast, for 
both medicine and psychology, which, recall, are quite a long way apart in the rank ordering shown 
in  
Figure 2, there is little or no difference between the beliefs of the better or worse informed 
citizen.  (The lines for physics, biology and mathematics are similar to that for medicine and are not 
shown here, in order to keep the graph intelligible.)  
A further exploration of the basis on which Europeans make judgments about the 
scientificness of these subjects was carried out using factor analysis.  Two separate analyses, one 
for each split half of the sample, were performed using maximum likelihood estimation and oblique 
rotation. Table 1 shows the factor loadings for the three factor model that resulted, based on an 
examination of the scree plot and substantive interpretability. An obliquely rotated solution was 
preferred because I assume that there are individual differences in the propensity to agree or 
disagree that any subject is scientific, as well as a tendency to discriminate between groups of 
similar subjects. The assumption is therefore that the factors will be positively correlated, which is 
what the oblique rotation achieves. 
 
Table 1  Three factors underlying perceptions of scientificness (astrology condition) 
 
Rotated Factor Pattern Loadings 
(Tot. var. explained 42%) 
 
„Hard science‟ „Soft science‟ 
„New age 
science‟ 
Physics 0.88 -0.07 -0.12 
Biology 0.61 0.00 0.04 
Medicine 0.58 -0.01 0.12 
Astronomy 0.49 -0.02 0.11 
Mathematics 0.49 0.29 -0.12 
Economics 0.02 0.71 0.01 
History -0.03 0.62 0.06 
Homeopathy 0.00 0.07 0.62 
Astrology 0.03 -0.02 0.44 
Psychology 0.11 0.32 0.37 
(Oblique rotation, Maximum Likelihood) 
 
I have labelled the three factors „hard science‟, „soft science‟ and, for want of a better term, 
„new-age science‟.  The highest factor loading for „hard science‟ is physics at 0.88, while the „soft 
science‟ includes economics and history, anchored by economics, at 0.71. Homeopathy, astrology 
and psychology form the „new-age science‟ group, although psychology has a weak cross-loading 
with „soft science‟.   
Figure 4 plots these loadings in the first two dimensions, with the third dimension, „new-age 
science‟, indicated by the size of the bubbles. The reason for the „new age‟ label is that the three 
subjects that load on this factor are the kind of subjects that people expect to see in the self-help, 
pop-psychology or new age therapy sections of bookstores. The representation of psychology for 
the European public is perhaps less about, for instance, cognitive neuroscience and more about self-
help for overcoming depression.   
In  
Table 2, the rotated solution for the sample that were asked about horoscopes is presented. 
The main difference is that only two factors are needed to describe the cognitive structure 
organising responses to the ten subjects. 
 
 
Figure 4  Factor loadings plot: astrology condition 
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There is no separate „new-age science‟ dimension, with horoscopes, homeopathy and 
psychology joining history and economics to form a „soft science‟ group. The „hard science‟ 
subjects remain the same, with physics again anchoring the factor with the highest loading, at 0.78. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Solid bubble size = 3rd 
dimension  „New age science‟ (clear 
bubble indicates negative  loading on 
3rd dimension) 
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 Table 2  Two factors underlying perceptions of scientificness (horoscopes condition) 
 
Rotated Factor Pattern Loadings 
(Tot. var. explained 36%) 
 
„Hard science‟ „Soft science‟   
Physics 0.78 -0.11 
 Biology 0.63 0.05 
 Medicine 0.60 0.03 
 Mathematics 0.52 0.17 
 Astronomy 0.52 0.09 
 History 0.12 0.55 
 Economics 0.17 0.52 
 Psychology 0.26 0.50 
 Horoscopes -0.30 0.48 
 Homeopathy 0.08 0.43 
 (Oblique rotation, Maximum Likelihood) 
 
The factor loadings are plotted in Figure 5, where it is possible to clearly see the two 
groupings. Note also that horoscopes is the only „soft science‟ subject that loads negatively on the 
hard science dimension. This was not the case for astrology, demonstrating further evidence that the 
latter perceived as being more like a science subject. 
The results seen thus far indicate fairly unequivocally that while horoscopes and astrology 
are to all intents and purposes the same thing, at least in so far as the casual engagement of the 
average citizen is concerned, the two terms have rather different connotations.  
 
Figure 5 Factor loadings plot: horoscopes condition 
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Astrology probably „sounds‟ more scientific than horoscopes, it is consequently evaluated as 
being more scientific and is viewed in a more similar way to psychology and homeopathy than are 
horoscopes. Having elaborated a description of how astrology is perceived, the following section 
turns to the question of what might underlie the variation in these perceptions amongst citizens and 
across European states. 
 
3.3 Variation in beliefs between citizens 
The final part of the analysis is a multivariate investigation of social and psychological 
factors that might influence individuals‟ propensity to believe that astrology is a scientific subject. 
To do this I use a variant of an OLS multiple regression model. 
This analysis is primarily to examine individual level factors associated with beliefs about 
astrology. However, there is also likely to be heterogeneity of beliefs between the 25 European 
countries, even after taking into account individual characteristics.  Modelling this situation calls for 
country to be included as either a fixed or random effect. The first approach essentially gives each 
country its own dummy variable and regards each as a unique entity, so to speak. The second 
approach treats the countries in the dataset as a random sample of potential countries that could 
have been included and estimates a single mean and variance for a continuous random variable that 
„Soft 
science‟ 
„Hard 
science‟ 
captures the heterogeneity across countries (Raudenbusch & Bryk, 2001).  The model parameters 
can then be used to derive an estimate of each country‟s location in the distribution of this variable.   
If the individual level effects are uncorrelated with this country random effect, the random 
effects estimator is unbiased and preferred over the fixed effects one, because it is more efficient.  If 
this assumption is not met, the fixed effects approach is appropriate. The result of a Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978), which tests for the presence of this correlation, was highly non-significant (Chi
2
 
5.86, 17df, p=0.99) so the final model presented here uses the random effects estimator.  
 
Table 3 Random effects regression estimates (individual characteristics) 
(n=11622) 
 
B SE Z p 
Age (reference category 15-24)     
25-39 -.12 .04 -2.66 .01 
40-54 -.14 .04 -3.34 <.01 
55+ -.22 .04 -5.22 <.01 
Female .06 .03 2.18 .01 
Higher education -.19 .03 -5.75 <.01 
Professional or management occupation -.08 .04 -1.89 .06 
Large town or city dweller -.10 .03 -3.04 <.01 
Religious belief     
Catholic .13 .04 3.70 <.01 
God .08 .04 2.02 .04 
Spirit .12 .04 3.21 <.01 
Right wing political orientation .01 .004 2.26 .02 
Science knowledge     
Quiz score -.09 .01 -17.42 <.01 
Mentions hypothesis testing -.25 .06 -4.55 <.01 
Mentions measurement -.21 .05 -4.52 <.01 
Authoritarian .22 .02 10.36 <.01 
Astronomy scientific .32 .01 26.80 <.01 
All scientific .24 .02 12.41 <.01 
     
(Intercept) 1.18 .14 8.67 <.01 
 
 
Table 3 presents the estimates for the model predicting beliefs about astrology.  Higher 
scores on the dependent variable indicate stronger belief that astrology is scientific.  The included 
predictors account for 17 per cent of the variance in beliefs. Turning first to hypothesis H2a, the 
expectation was that there should be some correlation between beliefs about astronomy and beliefs 
about astrology because of semantic confusion. This is indeed the case here. The coefficient for 
astronomy is .35 with a very small standard error. Net of all other modelled influences, the more 
likely it is that citizens believe astronomy is scientific, the more likely they are to think that 
astrology is also scientific.  It appears that the two subjects are not always well differentiated in 
European public imagination.  In order to counter potential objections to this conclusion, I have 
included an additional variable („all scientific‟) that is calculated as the mean of respondents‟ belief 
scores on all the other subjects except for horoscopes and homeopathy.  Without this control, it 
could be argued that the correlation between astronomy and astrology is due to individual 
differences in the propensity to express the view that anything is scientific. The inclusion of this 
variable, though, does not eliminate the positive coefficient for astronomy.  
Hypothesis H2b, if supported, would corroborate further this interpretation. I would not expect to 
see the same positive relationship between astronomy and horoscopes, precisely because they do 
not sound similar.  To test this, I fitted the same model using the other split half of the sample and 
designating horoscopes as the dependent variable. The pattern of results is very similar to that in 
Table 3  but, crucially, the coefficient for astronomy is very small, at .05 (SE=.01; Z=4.23; p<.01), 
compared to the estimate in the astrology model.   
Hypothesis three concerns the relationship of scientific knowledge or literacy with 
perceptions of astrology. The expectation is that those who are better endowed with civic scientific 
literacy will be better able to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Therefore, I expect positive 
coefficients for the knowledge measures.  Looking at Table 3, one can see that this is indeed the 
case. The coefficients for all three knowledge variables are negative and statistically significant, 
meaning that the more knowledgeable a person is, the less scientific they believe that astrology is.  
To get a sense of the magnitude of the effects, if one compared a citizen who scored at the mean on 
the quiz and mentioned neither hypothesis testing nor measurement in their open ended answer, 
their expected rating of astrology would be one point higher on the five point scale (in the „more 
scientific‟ direction) than a European mentioning both measurement and hypothesis testing and who 
scored at the maximum on the quiz, with all other variables held constant. Particularly interesting is 
the fact that science knowledge has an effect even after controlling for education. 
The fourth hypothesis addressed in the analysis considers the relationship of authoritarian 
personality type with beliefs about astrology. The coefficient for the authoritarianism question is 
positive, at .22, and highly significant. For each one point increase on the „importance of obedience‟ 
question the model predicts just under a one quarter point increase in the scientificness of astrology 
rating. So, controlling for all the other covariates, the predicted difference in belief about astrology 
between Europeans who don‟t think obedience is at all important to teach to children and those who 
think it very important is just slightly more than one scale point. Here, then, is empirical support for 
Adorno‟s linking of authoritarianism and openness to pseudoscience.  Note again that this 
relationship is robust to the full range of other controls in the model, in particular age, education 
and conservative or right wing political orientation.  
People who report believing in God or in a „spirit of some kind‟ are more likely to think 
astrology is scientific. Catholics are also more likely to express this view. These results are again in 
line with what one might expect from Adorno‟s account of the appeal of astrology to those who 
have a propensity to defer to higher authority of different kinds, including religion.  I have no clear 
explanation for why Catholics should be more likely to be credulous of astrology but it should be 
borne in mind that this finding of course controls for country as well as for individual 
characteristics. This means that religious denomination here is not simply a proxy for divergent 
beliefs of citizens from predominantly Catholic and non-Catholic European states.  
The coefficients for the other socio-demographic variables are worth noting. Women are 
slightly more likely than men to think astrology is scientific, as are people who self-identify as 
being politically on the right. Those who live in large urban areas, who are better educated and in 
high status occupations are all less likely to accord astrology scientific credibility. A rather 
interesting finding is that older people tend to be less credulous of astrology. It is the youngest age 
group, 15-24, that regards astrology as most scientific. This invites speculation as to whether it is a 
lifecycle or a cohort effect we are seeing here. Do people become more sceptical as they age? Or 
are younger generations in general less sceptical than their parents? This is something for further 
research to establish.     
 
3.4 Variation in beliefs between countries 
Table 4 shows the variance components estimates for both individual and country levels.  
This can be thought of as the proportion of unexplained, residual variation between individuals and 
between countries.  The first two columns of the table show these variance estimates and the 
corresponding percentages for a model where only the intercept is fitted. In other words, it simply 
partitions total variation into within-group and between-group (individual and country). As little as 
13 percent of the variation in beliefs about astrology is systematically related to country, while the 
remainder is due to inter-individual variation. When the full model, with all the independent 
variables is estimated, the proportion due to country drops by around on third, to 8 percent. This 
indicates that some of the apparently systematic country variation is due to compositional 
differences in populations on the individual characteristics entered into the model.   In general 
terms, it would appear that the social-psychological factors that influence beliefs about astrology 
and science across Europe are broadly common to citizens from all countries.  
 
Table 4  Variance components for intercept-only and full models 
 Intercept-only model Full model 
 
Variance (SE) 
% of total 
variance Variance (SE) 
% of total 
variance 
Individual level residual 2.08 (.03) 87 1.80 92 
Country residual .27 (.08) 13 .14 8 
 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that there is no systematic difference between countries at all. 
One way of exploring this is to obtain estimates of the unobserved country level random effect 
variable and to compare estimates across countries. These estimates are also known as „empirical 
Bayes estimates‟(Raudenbusch & Bryk, 2001).  These can be thought of as unexplained country 
level residuals, expressed in standard deviations from the mean (zero), after taking into account all 
the individual level variables in the model. There is a surprisingly clear pattern to the variation.  
Controlling for the individual characteristics of citizen, all of the former Eastern bloc countries are 
more accepting of astrology as being scientific than the model would predict, while the majority of 
western European states have more skeptical citizens than would be expected given the individual 
attributes of their citizens.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows standardised random effects estimates for each of 25 European member 
states. These can be thought of as unexplained country level residuals, expressed in standard 
deviations from the mean (zero), after taking into account all the individual level variables in the 
model. There is a surprisingly clear pattern to the variation.  Controlling for the individual 
characteristics of citizen, all of the former Eastern bloc countries are more accepting of astrology as 
being scientific than the model would predict, while the majority of western European states have 
more skeptical citizens than would be expected given the individual attributes of their citizens.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6  Standardised random effect estimates for 25 European countries 
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Finland
Greece
France
Belgium
UK
Sweden
Italy
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Austria
Portugal
Germany
Hungary
Denmark
Ireland
Slovenia
Cyprus
Malta
Spain
Latvia
Czech Republic
Poland
Estonia
Lithuania
Slovakia
Standardised random effect estimates
 
 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
Europeans have a range of beliefs about astrology and its status as a scientific or quasi-
scientific subject. The evidence from the experiment and from the observational data show that 
there is considerable blurring over what the term means. There is a clear confusion between 
astronomy and astrology. There are also widely differing opinions on horoscopes as compared to 
astrology, even though one might consider the two as functionally equivalent to most intents and 
purposes. Astrology is regarded as more scientific than horoscopes. Perhaps previous research on 
science literacy that has gauged the credulousness of citizens about astrology has led to rather more 
pessimistic conclusions than are really warranted.  
However, science literacy clearly makes a difference. Net of a range of other potential 
confounding influences, the better is one‟s understanding of scientific terms and concepts, as well 
as factual knowledge of science, the better one is able to distinguish science from pseudo-science. 
This immunising effect of scientific knowledge is perhaps not a surprising finding, but one that 
underlines the utility of these survey indicators in distinguishing between modes of citizen 
reasoning about science and confirms the importance of scientific literacy in helping Europeans 
make informed judgments about the validity of pseudoscientific claims. While this study has not 
focused on health and consumer choices, it is quite possible that the model presented here holds 
across a range of pseudo-scientific domains in which citizens are confronted with the need to make 
choices.  
The result that authoritarian-type values are associated with greater credulity towards 
astrology is fascinating and in line with Adorno‟s prediction. Whether it is because of a general 
propensity to defer to any kind of authority, or whether it is bound up with anti-rational culture in 
the way that Adorno hypothesised is open to question. Further research could profitably be directed 
towards a greater elaboration of the mechanisms underlying the observations made in the present 
study. Perhaps linked to this finding are the systematic country variations. Former Eastern bloc 
states seem to be more accepting of astrology and more likely to consider it scientific. This holds 
true even conditioning on science literacy, religion, education, political orientation and values.  
Citizens of these countries have a recent history of state and civil society being organised along 
authoritarian lines, and this cultural norm may be reflected in the readier acceptance of astrology in 
Eastern Europe, over and above that due to variation in individual personality traits. 
This investigation has explored some of the correlates and putative causes of different 
beliefs about astrology and its relationship with science. As a final note, it should probably be borne 
in mind that for most people, reading a horoscope is a leisure activity and not one of central 
importance either. Nevertheless, by understanding how Europeans differ in their perceptions of 
astrology and horoscopes, it is possible to gain some insight into the bases of how citizens evaluate 
scientific and pseudoscientific claims more generally.  
 APPENDIX 
Question items 
Here is a list of qualities that children might be 
encouraged to learn at home. Please indicate for 
each of them how important you consider it to 
be. .....‟Obedience‟ 
Very important, Fairly important, Not very 
important, Not at all important,  Don‟t know  
(not offered by interviewer as a response) 
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